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‘To Win the Energies of Intoxication
for the Revolution’
Body Politics, Community, and Profane Illumination
Sami Khatib
AUTHOR'S NOTE
This article is indebted to Michael Löwy’s illuminating article on Walter Benjamin and
Surrealism: The chemical nuptials of two materialisms. It is also inspired by Marc Berdet’s
introduction In the Magnetic Fields of Materialism and Anthropology (see both articles in this
issue: Anthropology + Materialism. Issue 1). An earlier version of this article was presented at
the “Historical Materialism” conference Nov. 2011, London. I would like to thank Hannah
Forbes Black, Alison Hugill, and Sam Dolbear for their comments and corrections.
“… To live an event as an image is not to see an
image of this event, nor is it to attribute to the
event the gratuitous character of the imaginary.
The event really takes place – and yet does it
‘really’ take place? The occurrence commands us,
as we would command the image. That is, it




1 According to Walter Benjamin's 1929 essay on French surrealism, “[t]o win the energies
of intoxication for the revolution” was the central “project about which surrealism circles
in all its books and enterprises” (Benjamin 1978: 55). In this article I will claim that we
might expand Benjamin's characterisation of surrealism, taking it as a central motto of
his  own revolutionary  thought.  Through terms like  “image-space”  (Bildraum),  “body-
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space” (Leibraum), and “profane illumination”, Benjamin is able to designate a sphere of
indifference between sobriety and ecstasy, individuality and collectivity, time and space,
corporeal  immediacy  and  figurative  presentation.  Profane  illumination  is a  kind  of
materialist epiphany inaccessible to contemplative thinking and intentional acting, which
ushers in the immediacy of an “image-space.” This space is not miraculously emergent
but can only be formed through and within political action. The collective subjectivity that
inhabits and literally incorporates this space emerges neither through the traditional
structures of disciplined cadres in party politics and nor the spontaneous anarchy of the
amorphous  masses.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  authentic  political  community  that
precedes  revolutionary  action.  For  Benjamin,  community,  image-space,  and  political
action mutually presuppose each other; there is no solid ground on which revolution can
be  predetermined.  The  same  goes  for  political  agency.  The  site  of  a  revolutionary
community, the space where this community comes into being, is the interpenetration of
a collective body-space and the image-space of political action. Due to its immediate, non-
representational emergence and indeterminacy, the political collective inhabiting this
space  has  no  stabile  essence  in  itself.  Rather,  it  alludes  to  an  “unworking”  or
“inoperative” community that French thinkers like Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy
have conceptualised. Foreshadowing this “unworking” or self-dismantling community,
Benjamin puts forward a new concept of technology according to which technology is not
anymore an instrumental means to master nature but a “pure means”, whereby collective
politics  and  individual  experience,  human  physics  and  inorganic  nature  playfully
intersect, giving rise to a new post-humanist, techno-anthropological life form in which




2 For the moment, let us start with Benjamin's paradoxical idea of a profane illumination, a
moment  of  dialectical  illumination  when the  opposition  between  enlightened
consciousness and mythical or religious experience is suspended. The Surrealism-essay
reads:
[A]s  we  know  an  ecstatic  component  lives  in  every  revolutionary  act.  This
component is identical with the anarchic. But to place the accent exclusively on it
would be to subordinate the methodical and disciplinary preparation for revolution
entirely to a praxis oscillating between fitness exercises and celebration in advance
(Benjamin 1978: 55). 
3 It  goes  without  saying  that  Benjamin  here  refers  to  the  classic  opposition  between
libertarian anarchism and hierarchical structures of Leninist parties. His surrealistically
inspired suggestion to overcome this non-dialectical duality leads to a materialist theory
of perception and a revision of the commonplace dichotomy of sober ratio and enthusiast
affect. As Benjamin's essay proceeds:
Any  serious  exploration  of  occult,  surrealistic,  phantasmagoric  gifts  and
phenomena presupposes a dialectical intertwinement to which a romantic turn of
mind [romantischer Kopf, literally: 'romantic head'] is impervious. For histrionic or
fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious takes us no further; we
penetrate  the mystery  only  to  the degree  that  we recognize  it  in  the everyday
world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable,
the impenetrable as everyday (ibid.).
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4 Although Benjamin is commenting on the difference between (French) surrealism and
(German) romanticism, we might read this quote in light of the ‘actually existing
surrealism’ of the capitalist everyday. Benjamin's “dialectical optic” aims “to perceive the
everyday as impenetrable” in the same spirit as Marx, when he conceives of the capitalist
world of positive factuality – commodified things (Sachen) and facts – as the objective
cover [sachliche Hülle, literally: objective/thingish shell] of social relations. The objective
impenetrability of the everyday resides,  as Marx put it,  in the “mystical character of
commodities.” To quote from the famous opening lines of his chapter on commodity
fetishism:  “A  commodity  appears,  at  first  sight,  a  very  trivial  thing,  and  easily
understood. Its analysis shows that it  is,  in reality,  a very tricky thing, abounding in
metaphysical  subtleties and theological  niceties” (Marx 1962:  85).  Reading these lines
through Benjamin's “dialectical optic”, we perceive the most trivial occurrences and facts
of  the  everyday  precisely  as  a  real-sur-real,  or,  as  Marx  put  it,  sinnlich-übersinnliche, 
“sensuous-supra-sensuous” sphere in which the “occult character” of capital as a purely
social (supra-sensuous)  relation  is  expressed  by  (sensuous)  things  (ibid.).  From  this
perspective, the exploration of occult, surrealistic, phantasmagoric gifts and phenomena
is not about an inner experience, but about the perception of the world of commodities as
literally sur-real, over- or hyper-real shape. Hence, a materialist inquiry into the social
metaphysics of physical things must rid itself of all naturalistic and positivist attitudes,
thus revealing the objective, thing-ish semblance of the capitalist everyday in its sur-real
– “over-” or “supra”-real – character. 
5 Around the same time as Benjamin wrote his essay on surrealism, Georges Bataille, who
would later become Benjamin’s friend, formulated a harsh critique of Breton’s Second 
Manifesto of Surrealism (1929) accusing the surrealists of a “predilection for values above
the ‘world of facts’” (Bataille 1985: 33). In his essay on The “Old Mole” and the Prefix Sur in
the  Words  Surhomme and Surrealist, Bataille  mercilessly condemned any romanticist  or
idealist orientation “sur” or “above” reality. For Bataille surrealism’s failure consists in
the  elevation of  a  reality  beyond  what  he  later  developed  as  a  post-surrealist  base
materialism.  He  argued  that  “since  surrealism  is  immediately  distinguishable  by  the
addition of low values (the unconscious, sexuality, filthy language, etc.), it invests these
values with an elevated character by associating them with the most immaterial values”
(ibid.:  39).  Apart  from the question of  whether Bataille  rightly points to surrealism’s
hidden idealism, he underestimates the literally sur-reality of what he calls the “world of
facts”, that is, the meta-physics of commodified physics. In other words, the commodity
form is in the prefix “sur” itself – therein lies the metaphysics of the “base” physics of
capitalist everyday life. 
6 The ‘home-grown surrealism’ of capitalist realism sheds light on the limits of any sort of
romanticist anti-capitalist critique. Such a romantic critique articulates, as Michael Löwy
argues  in  this  issue,  “a  world  view,  a  cultural  protest  against  the  capitalist
disenchantment of the world, against modern bourgeois civilization, in the name of pre-
capitalist values” (Löwy 2013). Against such a theoretical and literary project, we have to
acknowledge that capitalism is not just about a disenchantment of the world, which could
be criticised by way of romantic re-enchantment as Löwy defines, but also and moreover
about  an  inherent  mode  of  re-enchantment  through  disenchantment.  From  this
perspective,  romanticism  and  then  surrealism  are  either  critical  or  affirmative
articulations of capitalism’s own paradoxically immanent transcendence. That is to say,
the meta-physics of the physics of the commodity form is not merely an illusion but the
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very form of a “real-abstract” reality in which things act out social relations. This almost
spectral – sensuous-supra-sensuous – mode of production is simultaneously both sur-real
and real.  Therefore,  it  is  not  enough to  simply  criticise  capitalism’s  “transcendental
homelessness” (Georg Lukács)  in the name of  pre-modern values and to ‘homesickly’
yearn for a new aesthetic religion – a quasi-religious re-enchantment of the world out of
the sources of late romanticism and late surrealism. Rather, one must perceive the world
through Marx’s and Benjamin’s “dialectical optics”. This profoundly modern world is the
world of capital, be it in its aesthetic, economic, political, or ethical dimension. And it is
only this modern world of capital that produces a sur-reality that has become an integral
part  of  capitalist  reality  –  an  enchanting  (“phantasmagorical”)  reality  of  merciless
disenchantment.
7 It is the critical side of Benjamin's “dialectical optics” that takes issue with this romantic
attitude – an attitude that hypostatises the “mysterious side of the mysterious” instead of
soberly recognising occult and phantasmagoric phenomena as an integral part of reality
as sur-reality. In the same way, political struggle is not about tarrying with the ecstatic
intoxication  inherent  to  authentic  revolutionary  action  but  about  letting  its  sober,
profane face come to the fore. This is what is meant when a profane illumination opens
up a sphere, a bodily image-space in the midst of political action. “To win the energies of
intoxication for  the  revolution”  does  not  mean the  total  immersion of  the  self  in  a
collective communion of transgressive ecstasy – but to traverse the thresholds of these
experiences, to oscillate between reality and sur-reality, in order to exit them and to enter
the  collective  image-space  of  politics.  Hence,  the  dream-like  threshold  experiences
become not the final goal but a necessary transition of political action that dismantles,
“unworks” the strict boundaries of the capitalist individual from within, to give rise to a
non-totalitarian, non-formatted community.
In the world’s structure dream loosens individuality like a bad tooth. This loosening
of  the  self  by  intoxication  is,  at  the  same  time,  precisely  the  fruitful,  living
experience that allowed these people to step outside the domain of intoxication. […]
But the true, creative overcoming of religious illumination certainly does not lie in
narcotics.  It  resides  in  a  profane  illumination,  a  materialistic,  anthropological
inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory
lesson (Benjamin 1978: 48).
8 This intoxicated introductory lesson opens up an unmediated sphere “where sound and
image, image and sound interpenetrate with automatic precision and such felicity” (ibid.:
48) whereby no space is left for meaning, sense and moralism – whereby collective acting
is  freed  from  all  representational  tasks  immediately  presenting  themselves  as
revolutionary action. Before we come back to this sphere, which is nothing else than the
above-mentioned  image-space,  let  us  take  a  closer  look  at  Benjamin's  concept  of
intoxication.
9 As already indicated, the concept of profane illumination engages with intoxication and
religion in a dialectical way that neither totally affirms these experiences nor simply
negates their importance and impact. The theoretical background of this conception can
be found in the traditional opposition of soberly rational thinking within the limits of
reason and the enthusiastic affect always aiming at transcending rationality's boundaries.
It  was  Immanuel  Kant's  distinction  between  enthusiasm  and  Schwärmerei (visionary
rapture)  that defined the hair-splitting but crucial  line between potentially universal
judgments about the sublime and falsely romanticist delusions.
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If enthusiasm can be compared with the delusion of sense [Wahnsinn], then visionary
rapture [Schwärmerei] is to be compared with the delusion of mind [Wahnwitz], the
latter of which is least of all compatible with the sublime, since it is brooding and
absurd.  In  enthusiasm,  as  an  affect,  the  imagination  is  unreined;  in  visionary
rapture, as a deep-rooted, oppressive passion, it is unruled. The former is a passing
accident, which occasionally affects the most healthy understanding; the latter is a
disease that destroys it (Kant 2000: 157).1
10 It is precisely this passing accident – what might be called a Freudian slip – that Benjamin
is drawing upon to conceptualise the function of intoxication for profane illumination. (In
this context it might be instructive to remember that Benjamin was very familiar with
Kant's aesthetic of the sublime as theorised in Kant's third critique and held the Kantian
text in high esteem even after his materialist turn in 1924.) Intoxication – be it triggered
by  drugs,  religion  or  other  threshold  experiences  –  can  be  regarded  as  Benjamin's
anthropological-materialist name for enthusiasm [Begeisterung], which – in Kantian terms
– might be compared with the delusion of sense [Wahnsinn]. Profane illumination is thus
strictly to be differentiated from its Kantian opposition, Schwärmerei (visionary rapture)
leading to a delusion of mind. The Hegelian conceptualisation of Schwärmerei – that of
fanaticism – elucidates the structure of profane illumination further. Whereas for Hegel,
fanaticism  is  enthusiasm  for  the  abstract2,  for  Benjamin's  profane  illumination  is
enthusiasm for the concrete, or, more precisely, for the immediate mediacy of political
action where body and image intersect. The key concept to understand this concreteness,
which,  in  Hegelian  terms,  would  be  a  “concrete  totality,”  is  the  image-space–  an
experimental figure of thought that Benjamin later dropped in favour of the “dialectical
image”  and  its  political-transcendental  condition  in  the  “now  of  recognisability”  as
developed in the later Arcades Projects. 




12 Referring to Aragon's book Traité du Style, Benjamin draws a parallel of style and politics.
Just as style requires a distinction between metaphor and image, so does politics. While
the metaphor, literally meta-phorein, saying something differently, transferring meaning
to  an  image,  always  employs  an  image  to  designate  something  else  –  a  meaning  –
Aragon's image can only stand for itself. The same goes for politics, as Benjamin claims:
the task for materialist politics hence is “to expel moral metaphor from politics and to
discover within the space of political  action the one hundred per cent image-space [
Bildraum]. This image-space, however, can no longer be measured out by contemplation”
(Benjamin 1978: 56). This stance against representation and moralism aims at setting free
political action from all instrumental ideologies; political action is no longer the bearer of
something else – a higher morale, a programme, or an embodiment of history's progress
towards socialism – but an opening that presents itself as an immediate image, an image-
space  where  all  petty  bourgeois  moralism  becomes  inoperative,  where  all  external
meaning  is  extinguished.  Nothing  else  is  meant  when Benjamin  defines  the  task  of
authentic  politics  as  the  organisation  of  pessimism –  a  pessimism of  the  belief  that
politics can stand for something else, that is, historical progress, morale, teleologies. Seen
from this angle,  the Surrealism-essay follows Benjamin's early anarchic and messianic
nihilism turning the latter into an anthropological-materialist theory of politics. If this
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image-space  of  politics  devoid  of  any  moral  and  trans-historical  meaning  cannot  be
measured contemplatively,  it  can only be directly performed, staged, or embodied by
political action itself. At the non-representable intersection of body, image and political
language Benjamin locates the immediacy of an image-space that suspends intellectually
mediated concepts of the political. In contrast to traditional Marxist critiques of ideology,
he asks:
Where are the conditions for revolution? In the changing of attitudes or of external
circumstances? That is the cardinal question that determines the relation of politics
to morality and cannot be glossed over.  Surrealism has come ever closer to the
Communist  answer.  And  that  means  pessimism  all  along  the  line.  Absolutely.
Mistrust in the fate of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the
fate of European humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconciliation: between
classes, between nations, between individuals (ibid.: 55).
13 We  might  also  add  here:  mistrust  in  all  forms  of  political  representation,  all
contemplative  concepts  of  politics,  and  all  programmatic  visions  for  the  future.
Moreover, the question of revolutionary conditions cannot be posited as an alternative
between  economic  being  and  ideological  consciousness;  the  Archimedean  point  of
revolution can neither be deterministically deduced from 'objective' economic conditions
nor turned into a merely theoretical question of epistemology. From this perspective, it
should be clear that Benjamin acquires a singular position within the discourse of post-
Lukácsian critical Marxism since his departure from deterministic 'vulgar Marxism' does
not take an epistemological turn to arrive at a critique of ideology. Unlike Frankfurt
School theorists, Benjamin does not conceive of ideology as an obstacle for revolution but
as its very source. Phantasmagoria, dream-like fantasies, and collective dream-images can
be both limiting ideology and transgressive medium for a revolutionary standstill, stasis.
Consequently, the lumen, light of the profane il-lumination is not 'made' of a correct or
adequate consciousness, a knowledge about certain things but is an immediate medium in
which things and words,  individuality and collectivity,  enlightened consciousness and
dream-like fantasies coincide, or, more precisely, collide. Benjamin's demand to organise
pessimism is nothing else than a call to take away, to undo all moralist imperatives and
politically optimistic programmes to access this medium or sphere. 
14 But how are we to conceive of this space and how can political action enter it? In short,
Benjamin's answer remains pessimistic and anti-utopian: the entrance into the image-
space can not be intentionally found but only unintentionally opened up by threshold
experiences, Freudian slips, and other unexpected deviations of collective political action
itself:
For in the joke […], in invective, in misunderstanding, in all cases where an action
puts forth its own image and exists, absorbing and consuming it, where nearness
looks  with  its  own eyes,  the  long-sought  image-space  [Bildraum]  is  opened,  the
world of universal and integral actuality, where the ‘best room’ is missing – the
space, in a word, in which political materialism and physical nature share the inner
human, the psyche, the individual, or whatever else we wish to throw to them, with
dialectical justice, so that no limb remains untorn. Nevertheless – indeed, precisely
after  such dialectical  annihilation  –  this  will  still  be  an  image-space  and,  more
concretely, a body-space [Leibraum] (ibid.: 56).3 
15 The image-space  is  the  immediate  presentation  of  collective  political  action  without
formal political representation. Where nearness looks with its own eyes, where ultimate
proximity and auratic distance enter a stage of  mutual  indifference,  the image-space
becomes  real.  This  reality  is  not  stable,  it  is  fully  charged  with  dialectical  tensions;
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nevertheless, it contains a higher degree of actuality, more actual reality than reality can
contain. This higher degree of actuality is called “the world of universal and integral
actuality”, a term that Benjamin will later define as the messianic world (Benjamin 2003:
404).4
 
III. Body Politics and Community
16 In the Surrealism-essay, however, this universal and integral actuality designates a sphere
emerging in the midst of political action. The transformation or deformation (in Werner
Hamacher's  terms one might  say:  afformation5)  that  is  “at  work” in  this  image-space
“unworks”  the  boundaries  of  collectivity  and  individuality,  body  and  image.  If  the
experience of intoxication is able to loosen the bio-political cage of the modern individual
subject by permeating its boundaries vis-à-vis the collective, these boundaries are totally
torn  down  within  the  image-space  so  that  “no  limb  remains  untorn”,  no  line  of
demarcation remains at work. This is what is meant by “body-space” – a space in which
the inner experience is turned inside out, the corporeal individual shares a collective
body without being subsumed under it. The body-space is not the site of a carnivalesque
transgression, a Dionysian communion but designates a sphere where an emancipated
technology gives rise to a post-humanist, techno-anthropological community of loosened,
unworked individuals sharing a collective body. 
The collective is a body, too. And the physis [nature] that is being organized for it in
technology can, through all its political and factual reality, only be produced in that
image-space to which profane illumination initiates us. Only when in technology
body and image so interpenetrate that all  revolutionary tension becomes bodily
collective  innervation,  and  all  the  bodily  innervations  of  the  collective  become
revolutionary discharge, has reality transcended itself to the extent demanded by
the Communist Manifesto (Benjamin 1978: 56).
17 The key concept of this dense passage is “innervation”, a term that according to the
Benjamin  scholars  Miriam  Bratu  Hansen  and  Sarah  Ley  Roff  has  not  a  primarily
psychoanalytical but neuropsychological origin (Ley Roff 2004: 129). In neuropsychology
innervations refer to transfers of energy between the neurological system and the mind.
Benjamin's  interest  in  innervation,  however,  dates  back  to  his  early  sketches  on
“psychophysics”,  a  discipline  originally  coined  by  the  German  psychologist  Gustav
Theodor  Fechner.  Benjamin's  early  psycho-physical  studies  are  concerned  with  the
double intersection of the theological duality of soma [Leib] and psyche and the modern
split  between  body  [Körper]  and  spirit  [Geist].  In  the  Surrealism-essay  he  adds  an
anthropological-materialist  dichotomy  to  this  psycho-physical  problem,  that  is,  the
division  between  the  individual  and  the  political  collective.  As  a  result,  innervation
concerns  the  intersections,  interplays,  and  interdependencies  of  (1)  an  individual
corporeality [Körper] and a collective spirit – or, to use a Marxian term from the Grundrisse
:  “general  intellect”  –  and (2)  a  collective body [Leib]  and an individual  psyche.  The
implicit reference to Marx and his famous “Fragment on Machines” from the Grundrisse –
a text  Benjamin could not  have read at  that  time6 –  indicates  that  bodily  collective
innervation and bodily innervations of the collective allude to a new form of technology
in which a collective spirit  becomes corporeal,  has a collective body.  It  comes as no
surprise that Benjamin will  later quote from this passage on innervation in his most
famous essay on The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility from 1935/36.
In the latter essay the intertwinement of individual and collective innervation by which
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individual bodies literally become the nerves of the collective and vice versa, sheds light
on what Benjamin calls “second technology” – a liberated and emancipatory technology
the goal of which is not anymore “mastery over nature” like in capitalist-exploitative
“first technology” but an “interplay between nature and humanity” (Benjamin 2008: 26).
The  Surrealism-essay  already  features  key  elements  of  this  new  emancipatory,  non-
anthropocentric,  and non-instrumental form of technology that is  able to master the
interplay of techne, soma and physis, technology, body, and nature (One might add here
that more recent elaborations like Donna Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto point to a similar
direction7).
18 Benjamin's theologically charged name for the mode of existence that inhabits the zone
of indifference between politics, psychophysics, and psychoanalysis is the “creature” – a
term he distilled from the works of Franz Rosenzweig, Karl Kraus, Bertolt Brecht, Adolf
Loos, and the utopian science fiction novelist Paul Scheerbart. The creature denotes a
post-humanist state of being devoid of all idealist notions of humanity like creativity,
organic wholeness, and contemplative thinking. In other words: it marks the zero level,
the most deprived mode of human existence surviving the age of capitalist modernity. As
Benjamin notes in his fragment on the comic figure Mickey Mouse, the creature designates
a form of life that “can still survive even when it has thrown off all resemblance to a
human  being”  (Benjamin  2008:  338).  Mickey  Mouse  is  such  a  creature,  a  creature
undermining  “the  entire  hierarchy  of  creatures  that  is  supposed  to  culminate  in
mankind” (ibid.). The theological charge of the term creatureliness, hence, does not refer
to theology proper but to the decentring of the modern anthropocentric hierarchy of
creatures. The human being is the creature that language was given to; humans are being
created rather than Promethean creators. Therefore, creaturely life can never be creative
in a representational sense; it cannot bear any meaning other than itself. For Benjamin, a
fictional character like Mickey Mouse does not symbolise anything, be it  the cultural
downfall  of  Western civilization or the decline of  bourgeois culture,  but immediately
performs the non-symbolic presentation of  a creaturely life whose humanist  features
have been taken away. Nevertheless, likewise political action can immediately put forth
its own image, the creature can embody an immediate figuration. The creaturely body
quite literally stages an image, a bodily allegory of abstract social relations; for in the
image-space organic flesh is penetrated by technology forming a bodily image [Leibraum].
This image does not emerge from revolutionary action (like the image-space, Bildraum)
but arises in the midst of the capitalist everyday at the moment of its dissolution, failure,
dismantling. As Rainer Nägele comments:
Kreatur, as the figure of modernity, figures human subjectivity as a sexualized body
that  speaks,  as  the  flesh  permeated  by  the  word,  inscribing  the  body  in  the
experience of the law. Under this premise, the baroque allegorical personifications
as  incarnations  of  virtues  and  vices  are  the  most  precise  model  of  a  human
subjectivity whose flesh can be reduced neither to a pure physis nor to nineteenth-
century psychologism. It is in the Kreatur that, for Benjamin, the discourses of Marx
and Freud intersect in a way that puts Benjamin’s thinking at a far distance from
the 'Freudo-Marxism' of such members of the Frankfurt School as Erich Fromm and
Herbert Marcuse,  but also from the more subtle 'mediations'  of  Adorno (Nägele
2004: 161). 
19 Ultimately, it is the experience of the law, of the bio-political inscription of life as “bare
life”8 into a juridical web that has created the creature and its psycho-theological nervous
system. It is in this sense that the creature might be called the persisting yet non-vitalist
remainder of life at the moment when life is subtracted from itself. Creaturely life is not
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simply bare life but its flip side. If bare life, a life subjected under the law, is deprived life,
a life without a dimension “more” than life, creaturely life is just the “more” without the
life – the surplus without its substance. As Nägele rightly points out, the creature is not
reducible to a human essence; it rather designates a death-driven singularity that has lost
its properly subjective form that nevertheless incorporates, embodies a dimension of life
where life is more than life. The creature, hence, is the psycho-theological name of a life
form, in which a certain pressure, a “too muchness of life”, exists and persists as such9.
From  a  psychoanalytically  informed  Marxian  perspective,  the  creature  is  a  de-
subjectified,  undead life that remains once the boundaries of the atomised individual
have been crushed. 
20 In light  of  this  reading,  Benjamin's  revolutionary body politics  of  the image-space is
creaturely insofar as it does not allude to a carnival of bodies, an ecstatic communion but,
on the contrary, to a de-potentialisation (radisation, radix, root), an implosion of organic
wholeness, an “unworking” of binding energies, an undoing of all humanist essences – be
it  physics,  metaphysics  or  psyche.  Consequently,  the  image-space  as  the  “world  of
universal and integral actuality” is to be thought of as the universal and integral actuality
of  creaturely  life.  This  ‘higher’  stage  of  actuality  is  neither  a  higher  ideal  nor  an
intensified humanity,  a  Nietzschean Übermensch, but  a  de-potentialised actuality  that
paradoxically  contains  more  actuality  than  the  potentialities  of  everyday  life.  This
reduced yet condensed “integral actuality” is only real within the body- and image-space
and it is in this space where a loosened, “unworked” community can become reality – a
reality fully charged with creaturely life; a reality that extinguishes all vitalist, humanist,
and idealist forms of community; a reality in which sur- and sous-reality are ultimately
short-circuited.
21 As  mentioned  in  the  introductory  remarks,  this  community  implicitly  alludes  to  an
“inoperative” or “unworked community.” Referring to the works of Georges Bataille and
Maurice  Blanchot,  Jean-Luc  Nancy described this  “unworking”  as  a  withdrawal  from
work, as something that has no longer to do “either with production or with completion”
but,  rather,  “encounters  interruption,  fragmentation,  suspension”  (Nancy  1991:  31).
Community,  he  continues,  “is  made  of  the  interruption  of  singularities,  or  of  the
suspension that singular beings are. Community is not a work or even an operation of
singular beings, for community is simply their being – their being suspended upon its
limit” (ibid.).  With Benjamin we might add that  this  singular being is  creaturely the
community of which only arises from an unworking space, a bodily image-space. In this
space all singularities are suspension, a suspension of representation. The image-space is
immediately incarnated by fragmented, torn apart bodies permeated by technology. The
unworked community is ‘made’ of these fragmented bodies alluding to a post-humanist
mode  of  existence  once  modernity  has  dismantled  itself.  Politics,  hence,  is  the
‘inoperative operation’ that suspends all  modes of political-economic (“value-formal”)
and aesthetical (“phantasmagorical”) representation capitalism’s symbolic order hinges
on. It is this suspension, caesura whereby “an action puts forth its own image” – and
becomes an image-space.
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NOTES
1. Cf. Kant: “Wenn der Enthusiasm mit dem Wahnsinn, so ist die Schwärmerei mit dem Wahnwitz
zu vergleichen, wovon der letztere sich unter allen am wenigsten mit dem Erhabenen verträgt,
weil er grüblerisch lächerlich ist. Im Enthusiasmus, als Affekt, ist die Einbildungskraft zügellos; in
der  Schwärmerei,  als  eingewurzelter  brütender  Leidenschaft,  regellos.  Der  erstere  ist
vorübergehender Zufall, der den gesundesten Verstand bisweilen wohl betrifft; der zweite eine
Krankheit, die ihn zerrüttet” (Kant 1908: 275).
2. Cf. Hegel: “This enthusiasm was Fanaticism, that is, an enthusiasm for something abstract – for
an abstract thought which sustains a negative position towards the established order of things”
(Hegel  1986,  12:  431;  transl.  taken  from  http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/
works/hi/lectures4.htm)
3. Transl. modified, cf. Benjamin 1977: 309.
4. Cf. Benjamin 1974: 1239.
5. Cf. Hamacher 1994.
6. Marx’s  Grundrisse  were firstly  published in 1939/40 in Moscow;  however,  the war and the
‘Stalinist purges’ prevented the text from reaching a wider audience. In 1953, the German text of
the original Rohentwurf, draft version was published by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism of the
GDR. 
7. Cf. Haraway: “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature
of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most
important political construction, a world-changing fiction. […] By the late twentieth century, our
time,  a  mythic  time,  we  are  all  chimeras,  theorized  and  fabricated  hybrids  of  machine  and
organism; in short,  we are cyborgs.  This cyborg is our ontology;  it  gives us our politics.  The
cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres
structuring any possibility of historical transformation. In the traditions of 'Western' science and
politics--the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition
of  the  appropriation  of  nature  as  resource  for  the  productions  of  culture;  the  tradition  of
reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other - the relation between organism and
machine has been a border war” (Haraway 1991: 149f.).
8. The term “bare life” was originally introduced by Benjamin’s essay Fate and Character (1919)
and further elaborated in The Critique of Violence (1921). Bare life or “das bloße Leben” (Benjamin
1977: 200; cf. ibid.: 175) is life deprived of all its super-natural, that is ethical and meta-ethical
features. This reduced form of life is not to be conflated with natural, quasi biological life. Bare
life is the product of a social reduction, a privation of super-naturalness to mere naturalness. Life
as bare life thus does not designate a primal state before society but, on the contrary, the product
of a society in which life is violently subjected to the law. Benjamin’s technical term to account
for the dual character of legal violence (law-establishing or law-constituting violence and law-
preserving violence) is  “mythic violence” – a violence that endlessly reproduces itself  in the
positing of law and its application to bare life. In the essay on The Critique of Violence, Benjamin
opposes mythic violence by introducing the term “divine violence,” which is a paradoxical non-
violent or “pure” violence capable of undoing, abolishing, de-posing state-power, the law, and
the latter’s supplementing forms of violence: “For blood is the symbol of bare life [bloßen Lebens].
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The dissolution of legal violence stems […] from the guilt of more natural life, which consigns the
living, innocent and unhappy, to a retribution that 'expiates’ the guilt of bare life – and doubtless
also purifies the guilty, not of guilt, however, but of law. For with bare life, the rule of law over
the living [den Lebendigen] ceases. Mythic violence is bloody power over bare life for its own sake;
divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living” (Benjamin 1996: 250; transl.
modified). Drawing on Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben coined the
term “bare life” in his Homo Sacer series, stressing its social, non-biological meaning: “There are
not  first life  as  a  natural  biological  given and anomie  as  the  state  of  nature,  and then their
implication in  law  through  the  state  of  exception.  On  the  contrary,  the  very  possibility  of
distinguishing life and law, anomie and nomos, coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical
machine. Bare life is a product of the machine and not something that preexists it, just as law has
no court in nature or in the divine mind” (Agamben 2005: 87f.).
9. Eric  Santner’s  term  of  “psychotheology”  could  provide  a  framework  to  grasp  this  “too
muchness” of life: “Psychoanalysis differs from other approaches to human being by attending to
the constitutive ‘too muchness’ that characterizes the psyche; the human mind is, we might say,
defined by the fact that it includes more reality than it can contain, is the bearer of an excess, a
too much of pressure that is not merely physiological. The various ways in which this ‘too much’,
this  surplus life of  the human subject,  seeks release or discharge in the ‘psychopathology of
everyday life’  continues to form the central focus of Freudian theory and practice” (Santner:
2001: 8).
ABSTRACTS
This  article  discusses  Walter  Benjamin’s  essay on Surrealism (1929)  and focuses  on three key
elements  any  anthropological-materialist  concept  of  politics  has  to  address:  (1)  a  profane
illumination of the capitalist everyday life, (2) the problem of political representation, and (3) the
interdependency of body politics and the (im)possible community of political acting. This article
is a contribution to the ongoing debate on ‘what is anthropological materialism’ after Benjamin.
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